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Compelled Speech and the Regulatory State
ALAN K. CHEN*
Since the Supreme Court’s 1943 decision in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, it has been axiomatic that the First Amendment prohibits the government
not only from censoring speech, but also from compelling it. The central holding of
Barnette itself is largely uncontroversial—it seems obvious that the First
Amendment’s free speech clause means that no government may require people to
espouse or reproduce an ideological statement against their will. But the Court has
extended the compelled speech doctrine to stop the government from forcing people
to make even truthful, factual statements. These claims have resulted in some of the
most hotly contested free speech disputes the Court has addressed in recent years.
For instance, in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, the Court
invalidated provisions of a California law requiring self-styled “crisis pregnancy
centers” to post and distribute truthful information about the availability of statesponsored services, including abortion, for pregnant women and, where the centers
were not licensed to provide medical services, to disclose that fact. The Court held
that the First Amendment prohibits such compelled speech unless the disclosure is
“purely factual and uncontroversial,” and that abortion is “anything but an
‘uncontroversial’ topic.” If this is the appropriate legal standard, then the doctrine
must grapple with defining what makes facts controversial or not. This is problematic
for a number of reasons. First, facts, as opposed to ideas, would not ordinarily be
labeled as controversial. Second, because we are now living in a time of epistemic
chaos in public discourse, virtually any fact is now open to dispute, and thereby
controversial. Finally, because of increasingly polarizing contemporary debates
about the very role of government, the controversial fact standard risks devolving
into an infinite regress to the point where every fact is controversial because the role
of government regulation is itself controversial. If the Court does not articulate clear
and substantial limiting principles, widespread application of the compelled speech
doctrine ultimately will result in challenges to all government disclosure
requirements, undermining critical components of the regulatory state.

* Thompson G. Marsh Law Alumni Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of
Law. Thank you to the Indiana Law Journal and to Alex Tsesis and Caroline Mala Corbin for
organizing this symposium. I am also grateful to Rebecca Aviel, Jane Bambauer, Caroline
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, both judges and legal scholars have sounded an alarm about the
Supreme Court’s expansionist view of free speech doctrine. They suggest that the
Free Speech Clause’s application to invalidate regulatory provisions that would not
ordinarily be viewed as affecting speech signals an era of First Amendment
“Lochnerism,” in which businesses weaponize the Constitution to dismantle a range
of government regulations.1 While acknowledging the concerns underlying this
critique, I have been more reluctant than others to join the outcry, in part because
some of the cases that arguably represent this trend could also be understood to
provide the foundations for broader speech protection in more traditional contexts.
But Lochnerian concerns are much more troubling in the Court’s recent compelled
speech cases, which, taken to their logical extreme, could truly undermine the basic
functions and foundations of the entire regulatory state. This Essay offers a
preliminary exploration of those concerns and addresses some potential ways to
modify the path of the doctrine’s evolution to adequately protect speech while
accommodating the need for essential forms of governance.
The centerpiece of the Court’s new direction is National Institute of Family &
Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),2 in which it struck down provisions of a
California law requiring self-styled “crisis pregnancy centers” to post and distribute
information about the availability of state-sponsored services for pregnant women,
including abortion, and, where the centers were not licensed to provide medical

1. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search
for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1954 (2018); Amanda Shanor,
The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016). For a different perspective on these
concerns, see Enrique Armijo, Faint-Hearted First Amendment Lochnerism, 100 B.U. L. REV.
1377 (2020).
2. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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services, to disclose that fact.3 The law was a response to extensive complaints that
such centers are devoted to an antiabortion mission and often mislead women about
the services they provide.4 Drawing out of context some isolated language from a
lawyer advertising case, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits such
compelled speech unless the disclosure is “purely factual and uncontroversial,”
adding that abortion is “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”5 This standard is
problematic for a number of reasons, but primarily because, taken to its logical
extreme, it could lead to the invalidation of innumerable regulatory provisions
requiring even truthful factual disclosures.
In the modern regulatory state, the government routinely compels businesses,
institutions, organizations, and even individuals to disclose an extraordinary amount
of information. Indeed, governmental mandates requiring factual statements are so
ubiquitous most people probably rarely even think about them, much less consider
them to be a violation of their constitutional rights.6 For example, professionals in
many states have to publicly display their licenses to practice. Doctors have a duty
in every jurisdiction to secure informed consent before they perform some
procedures on their patients, which requires them to disclose the facts about the
attendant health risks and the availability of alternative treatments. Employers are
required to comply with a host of federal regulations directing them to post
information in their workplaces about labor rights and safety. Securities laws and
regulations include numerous corporate disclosure provisions. Restaurants typically
have to display their latest public health inspection “grades.” Producers of prepared
foods and pharmaceuticals must provide information about the contents of the
products they sell. While the NIFLA majority dismissed concerns that its ruling
would lead to invalidation of such laws, it provided no explanation why that would
be the case.7
It is unclear why the Court took this approach because, with one exception, the
concept of an uncontroversial fact is nowhere to be found in prior First Amendment
doctrine, though numerous lower courts recently have struggled to understand how
to apply it. To the extent that we apply a common meaning of controversial, such as
“[g]iving rise or likely to give rise to controversy or public disagreement,”8 it is
unclear how a fact, assuming it is objectively true, can in itself be controversial.9
Accordingly, it is hard to comprehend what free speech interests are implicated by
the vast majority of factual disclosures required by the State.

3. Id. at 2372.
4. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1340–41
(2014).
5. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
6. See infra Section II.A.
7. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2376.
8. Controversial, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/controversial [https://
perma.cc/YL6U-N3TR].
9. For a thorough account of the different possible meanings of uncontroversial fact, see
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Compelled Speech and the Irrelevance of Controversy, 47 PEPP. L.
REV. 731 (2020); see also Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J. 1351,
1380–87 (2019) (describing different lower court approaches to defining “uncontroversial”
facts).
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Further, even if we could agree upon a legally meaningful definition of
uncontroversial facts, the difficulties of this approach may persist for an entirely
different reason. For one thing, we are living through an age where disputes over
basic empirical, scientific, and even historical facts are increasingly contested, so
much so that the conflicts over truth have become ideological and therefore
controversial. Sharp partisan debates exist over whether climate change is caused by
human activity10 even though the consensus of scientific opinion is that it is.11 A
number of factual disputes concerning COVID-19 arose during the pandemic, such
as whether its spread can be minimized by wearing masks, even though their
effectiveness has been proven by medical evidence.12 The aftermath of the 2020
presidential election was a bizarrely contested narrative over whether the election
was “stolen” even in the absence of any objective evidence to support that claim.13
And not that long ago, critics perpetuated the false claim that President Obama was
not born in the United States, even after he produced his birth certificate.14 If there is
no such thing as objective truth, then everything can be contested, even when there
is no evidentiary support for those who don’t believe it. And if every fact can be
contested without regard to its basis, no fact is uncontroversial. To say the least,
assessing government requirements to disclose factual information in light of this
current state of epistemic chaos raises challenging questions about the scope and
limits of the compelled speech doctrine.
Finally, the conflict over facts that we are witnessing seems closely connected to
a fundamental debate about the very role of government. Some extremist groups
argue not only for limited government, but for virtually no government at all. If the

10. The Politics of Climate, PEW RSCH. CENT. (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/
[https://perma.cc/SC3G-LMVV] (reporting that only 15% of conservative Republicans
believe “Earth is warming due to human activity,” while 79% of liberal Democrats have this
belief).
11. Rick Rouan, Fact Check: Scientific Consensus Says Humans Are Dominant Cause of
TODAY
(Apr.
28,
2021,
3:22
PM),
Climate
Change,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2021/04/22/fact-check-scientificconsensus-humans-main-cause-climate-change/7336153002/
[https://perma.cc/E6XN8UAA] (“[S]cientists have concluded with a high degree of certainty that the dominant cause
of warming is human-produced greenhouse gases produced by humans becoming trapped in
the atmosphere.”).
12. John T. Brooks & Jay C. Butler, Effectiveness of Mask Wearing to Control Community
Spread of SARS-CoV-2, JAMA NETWORK: JAMA INSIGHTS (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2776536 [https://perma.cc/ZYJ2-QS3H].
Indeed, masks have become such a touchstone of controversy that a recent Wall Street Journal
op-ed piece suggested that requiring the wearing of masks even after vaccines have become
widely available is a form of compelled speech. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & James Taranto,
Opinion, Face Masks and the First Amendment, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2021, 12:41 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/face-masks-and-the-first-amendment-11621356093
[https://perma.cc/DE8C-K7Z2].
13. 2020 Electoral College Results, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/
electoral-college/2020 [https://perma.cc/3YR8-PZQA].
14. Jess Henig, Born in the U.S.A., FACTCHECK.ORG (Apr. 27, 2011),
https://www.factcheck.org/2008/08/born-in-the-usa/ [https://perma.cc/9X9J-ZFPB].
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very concept of government is believed to be illegitimate, then all laws that compel
factual disclosures are, by definition, similarly inappropriate because they are by
definition a product of government. Following this line of thinking, every
government compelled factual statement would be controversial under the NIFLA
standard, and therefore could be argued to violate the First Amendment, even if there
is no disagreement about the statement’s truthfulness.
This Essay attempts to map out some preliminary approaches to grappling with
some of these questions. In Part I, it sketches out the contours and contexts of the
First Amendment compelled speech doctrine and identifies some of the central
speech and autonomy concerns addressed by limits on government compelled
speech. Much of this is well-hewn ground, so this discussion is relatively brief. Part
II explores some of the many contexts in which federal, state, and local governments
compel individuals, businesses, and organizations to disclose truthful factual
information (it would be a monumental undertaking to catalog them all). In doing so,
this Part shows how the NIFLA “uncontroversial fact” standard could be used to
challenge and undermine a wide range of these laws. It argues that the default
position under First Amendment doctrine should be that government compelled
disclosures of factual information do not violate the First Amendment so long as the
facts are objectively true, the disclosure is reasonable in content and scope, and the
publication of the facts advances legitimate state interests. Having said that, there
still may be circumstances in which the State crosses the line from generally
applicable laws requiring factual statements to mandates that truly burden the
regulated party’s expressive and autonomy interests. Accordingly, in Part III, the
Essay discusses some limiting principles to the proposed default rule, recognizing
fully that there may be circumstances in which the government might overreach its
regulatory prerogatives to the point where even a compelled factual disclosure would
violate the First Amendment.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINES
A. The Distinct First Amendment Interests Implicated
by Government Compelled Speech
As other commentators have noted in great detail, there is no single compelled
speech doctrine, but rather several doctrines that apply to different forms of what
may be conceptualized as government compelled speech.15 First, there is the
paradigmatic, but fortunately rare, case of a law that requires individuals to say or
display a purely ideological statement with which they disagree. Only two Supreme
Court cases, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette16 and Wooley v.
Maynard,17 fall into this category.18 Much of the difficulty in understanding the

15. There is some disagreement about how many different categories of compelled speech
cases exist. See, e.g., NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
459–88 (7th ed. 2019); Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355,
388 (2018).
16. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
17. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
18. Arguably, the Court’s decision in Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l,
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doctrine revolves around the extrapolation of the law from those cases to other
contexts that, to varying degrees, involve some of the same First Amendment
interests.
Another category of cases deals with government regulations that compel the
disclosure of private, personal information about people who have engaged in
political association or speech, as in the Supreme Court’s decision invalidating a state
court order requiring the NAACP to report the names and addresses of its Alabama
members.19 We might include in this category cases assessing the constitutionality
of measures prohibiting the anonymity of speakers and people who sign petitions or
contribute money to election campaigns.20 Third, there is a group of cases that
address whether the government may, consistent with the First Amendment, compel
private entities to allow access to their property for other speakers.21 A variation
within this category includes challenges to laws that require private persons or groups
to associate with others in ways that arguably undermine or dilute their own speech
or message.22 And, finally, there are cases that involve laws that require licensed
professionals and businesses to disclose truthful factual information relating to their
services, operations, and products.23
In this Essay, I concern myself with only the first and last categories—compulsion
of purely ideological speech and requirements that businesses and professionals
disclose truthful factual speech. The other categories, I submit, are conceptually
distinct because they involve important associational interests that are not implicated
by bare compulsion of ideological or factual speech.24 In addition, the anonymous
speech cases, while focusing on the chilling of speech and political participation,
implicate qualitatively different First Amendment interests than compelled
ideological or factual speech. These cases are concerned with the chill coming from
intrusion on the speaker’s privacy interests rather than the distinct speech interests
described in the following paragraphs. As such, those cases involve indirect

Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013), also involves compelled ideological speech, though there the speech
requirement was imposed as a condition on government funding rather than a direct
compulsion.
19. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958).
20. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S.
334 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
21. See Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006); Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
22. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557
(1995).
23. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Riley v.
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary
Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
24. There is no shortage of respected scholars who have called for a serious reexamination
of the Court’s compelled speech doctrine. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein,
Toward a More Explicit, Independent, Consistent and Nuanced Compelled Speech Doctrine,
2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2020); Corbin, supra note 4; Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 365 (2014); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV.
867 (2015).
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constraints on actual speech, rather than compelled speech in the sense that the
compelled ideology and compelled fact statement cases view those laws.
The complexity in explaining the compelled speech doctrine comes not only from
the fact that it arises in so many different contexts, but also because these categories
implicate distinct First Amendment interests. Even within the compelled ideological
speech category, while most legal scholars agree with the outcome of the major cases,
they sometimes disagree about what speech interests are involved. One argument is
that when the government forces people to express messages they do not truly believe
or agree with, it results in a form of viewpoint discrimination.25 As I have described
this concern, “Those who agree with the mandatory recitation of the state’s script,
and the corresponding compulsion of political orthodoxy, are unburdened by the law,
whereas those who disagree with the state’s message (or agree with the message, but
still wish to remain silent) may be penalized for failing to comply.”26 There is also a
macro-effect on speech that is produced by such compulsions in that they distort the
overall composition and range of ideas in the marketplace and falsely suggest
ideological unity.27 Let’s call this the “viewpoint discrimination problem.”
Another claim suggests that the key First Amendment interest affected by
compelled ideological speech is the right not to be co-opted into serving as a
mouthpiece or amplifier of the government’s message. On this theory, compelled
ideological speech is problematic because it results in the misrepresentation of the
speaker’s beliefs, wrongly attributing to her ideas that are the government’s, not her
own.28 Such laws compromise the idea that the First Amendment prohibits laws that
prescribe government orthodoxy.29 We can refer to this as the “misattribution
problem.”
Finally, some commentators have focused on compelled speech as primarily a
problem of intellectual autonomy. Here, the argument goes, the compulsion of
speech goes deeper than the actual words spoken. The autonomy claim can work in
a couple of different ways. First, the government might compel someone to truthfully
divulge their own personal beliefs, creed, or other contents of their minds, when that
person may wish to keep their thoughts and beliefs private.30 Here, the argument is

25. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943) (“[L]aws must, to be
consistent with the First Amendment, permit the widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints
consistent with a society of free men.”).
26. Alan K. Chen, Forced Patriot Acts, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (2004)
(emphasis omitted).
27. Id. at 707.
28. Several commentators dismiss the misattribution problem, suggesting it is not a
realistic concern. See Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 409, 433 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009); Abner S. Greene,
The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 474 (1995). Although it is
beyond the scope of this Essay, I would argue that there is a nonzero risk of misattribution and
that it might be highly dependent on context.
29. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
30. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1317 (2d ed. 1988); Blasi &
Shiffrin, supra note 28, at 432–33. Abner Greene suggests on this basis that the right being
deprived is not freedom of expression, but the constitutional rights of personhood and
autonomy. Greene, supra note 28, at 480–82. Even requiring objectors to opt out of required
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that such compulsion intrudes on the privacy of one’s own thought processes that,
for many reasons, the speaker may wish to conceal from public scrutiny. It could also
be argued that to the extent personal deliberation is an ongoing process, such
compulsions might force an individual to disclose their beliefs prematurely. This type
of interest, however, does not typically arise in the Supreme Court’s compelled
speech cases. Rather, we can observe this analysis in contexts where the government
acts to compel disclosure of a person’s inner thoughts, as in the case of custodial
interrogations of criminal suspects.31
A second, alternative autonomy argument suggests that the compelled recitation
of ideological speech one does not agree with intrudes on personal dignity by
imposing the government’s will to inculcate state-sponsored values, thereby
interfering with one’s own deliberative processes.32 That is, the fear here is that the
repeated, cumulative recitation of a government compelled message could eventually
influence the unwilling speaker to begin agreeing with that message, like a subtle
form of brainwashing. We’ll refer to this as the “autonomy problem.”33

speech can be viewed as requiring them to signal their disagreement, thus serving as a version
of compelled revelation of one’s own beliefs. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 289 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing in context of school prayer that
“by requiring what is tantamount in the eyes of teachers and schoolmates to a profession of
disbelief, or at least of nonconformity, the procedure may well deter those children who do
not wish to participate for any reason based upon the dictates of conscience from exercising
an indisputably constitutional right to be excused.”). But see Greene, supra note 28, at 471
(“Assuming students don’t have to give reasons for opting out, it seems wrong to equate a
silent action of nonparticipation with a compelled expression of disagreement with the content
of the group utterance.”).
31. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (noting that “the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against self-incrimination] is the respect a
government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens . . . to
respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice
demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from his own mouth.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (observing that
“[t]he Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone
of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.”).
32. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 28, at 432.
33. Other scholars have identified other potential concerns with compelled ideological
speech. First, one might argue that compelled speech causes a chilling effect on speakers if
they would rather not speak at all than speak their own words along with the government’s
compelled speech. But if speakers are free to disclaim, rebut, or otherwise express their own
views in addition to the government’s compelled message, there actually may be an incentive
to speak more in order for speakers to distance themselves from that message. See Amar &
Brownstein, supra note 24, at 14 (“[T]he speakers’ ability to communicate their own messages
(alongside the messages they are being required to convey by the government) are generally
neither chilled nor silenced.”). Timothy Zick has argued that compelled speech in the
professional regulation context can sometimes influence or affect speech about other
constitutional rights, which is itself a potential red flag under the First Amendment. See
Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289 (2015); Timothy Zick,
Rights Speech, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2014).
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As these First Amendment interests suggest, at its core, the compelled speech
doctrine is primarily concerned with state-mandated expression of ideological
commitments. The doctrine is rooted in Barnette, a case addressing state compulsion
of schoolchildren to salute the U.S. flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance, a form
of loyalty oath.34 Such oaths are, when involuntarily recited, odious to freedom of
speech and thought, in part because they prescribe a form of nationalist, and therefore
ideological, orthodoxy. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Court’s frequently cited
admonition that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein.”35
In Wooley v. Maynard,36 the other major foundation on which the compelled
speech doctrine rests, the Court likewise focused on the ideological component of
the expression. New Hampshire’s official license plates, which had to be displayed
on all cars, bore the slogan “Live Free or Die,” a message that conflicted with the
plaintiffs’ religious and ideological beliefs. In that case, the Court held that the State
may not “constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of
an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for
the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public.”37
The Court has sometimes suggested that compelled statements of fact are no
different than compelled ideological speech. In Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,38 the Court invalidated a state law regulating charitable
solicitations by professional fundraisers. The law prohibited fundraisers from
retaining unreasonable or excessive fees for their work, defined by the percentage of
fees they charged.39 It also required fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the
“average percentage of gross receipts actually turned over to [the] charities” for
solicitations occurring in the past year.40 Charitable solicitation is a form of speech,
and the Court concluded that these provisions burdened the fundraisers’ expression
in violation of the First Amendment.
In striking down the law, the Court found that compelled factual statements are
no different from requirements of speech espousing an opinion.
These cases cannot be distinguished simply because they involved
compelled statements of opinion while here we deal with compelled
statements of “fact”: either form of compulsion burdens protected
speech. Thus, we would not immunize a law requiring a speaker favoring
a particular government project to state at the outset of every address the

34. 319 U.S. at 645. Justice Black’s concurring opinion referred to the Pledge as a “test
oath,” id. at 644 (Black, J., concurring), while Justice Frankfurter’s dissent distinguished the
Pledge from what he called “oath tests,” id. at 663 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Chen,
supra note 26, at 729 (likening the Pledge of Allegiance to a “mandatory oath”).
35. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
36. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
37. Id. at 713.
38. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
39. Id. at 784–85.
40. Id. at 786.
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average cost overruns in similar projects, or a law requiring a speaker
favoring an incumbent candidate to state during every solicitation that
candidate’s recent travel budget. Although the foregoing factual
information might be relevant to the listener, and, in the latter case, could
encourage or discourage the listener from making a political donation, a
law compelling its disclosure would clearly and substantially burden the
protected speech.41
Accordingly, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the disclosure requirement and held
that it was an unconstitutional burden on speech.42 In providing this example, the
Court overlooked an important distinction. Its hypothetical laws both required factual
statements by someone engaged in public discourse, where those utterances might
be viewed as compromising or at least diluting the speaker’s political viewpoint. That
makes them more like compelled ideological statements. But that seems markedly
different from compelling a private fundraiser to disclose that in the past year, the
average percentage of gross receipts it turned over to charities was 60% or 95%.
Unless one views the percentage charged to their clients as itself an object of
ideological disagreement, the First Amendment harms to fundraisers from the
compelled disclosure seem minimal at best.
Furthermore, Riley cannot possibly stand for the proposition that strict scrutiny
applies in every instance where the law requires the disclosure of a truthful fact.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts have reflexively applied this
most exacting scrutiny to all such cases. As discussed in Part II, doing so would
completely undermine the functioning of the regulatory state. Moreover, most
requirements that speakers make factual disclosures do not implicate important
speech interests.
B. Compelled Speech and the Standard of Scrutiny
Before proceeding to the discussion of government mandated factual statements,
it’s worth noting that the Court’s development of First Amendment doctrine in
compelled speech cases is quite different from its approach to laws that prohibit or
impede expression. The latter follows a well-recognized pattern of determining
whether the regulated activity counts as “speech,”43 whether the law regulates that
speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the content of the message,44 and
then applying either strict or intermediate scrutiny45 to assess whether the state has

41. Id. at 797–98; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1742 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (asserting
that compelled speech doctrine “applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or
endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid”) (quoting
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)).
42. Riley, 487 U.S. at 798.
43. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402–03 (1989).
44. Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and
Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 37–39 (2003) (describing the
Court’s methodology regarding the relevance of how a regulation targets speech).
45. Id. (describing difference between strict and intermediate scrutiny).
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provided a sufficient interest to overcome the speaker and listener interests in an
appropriately tailored manner.
These standard doctrinal tests do not map well onto compelled speech laws.46
First, by definition, all compelled speech requirements are content based (though
many are not viewpoint based, an important point we will return to later). Pledge of
Allegiance laws, for example, provide a specific script of words to be recited. Food
labeling regulations require processors of prepared foods to include particular facts
about nutrition on their packaging. But it cannot be the case that all content-based
compelled speech laws are subject to strict scrutiny, and accordingly, to almost
certain invalidation.47 It is possible that something approximating the contemporary
strict scrutiny test would apply to compulsions of purely ideological speech. The
majority opinion in Barnette contains somewhat comparable language when it states
that First Amendment rights may only be constrained “to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect,”48 but at the
same time it does not employ the now-standard consideration of narrow tailoring.49
By the time the Court decided Wooley, however, it had fully embraced language that
we commonly associate with strict scrutiny. There, the Court required New
Hampshire to justify its license plate law with a compelling interest and to do so
through the “le[ast] drastic means.”50
In other compelled speech cases, however, the Court has applied a much more
deferential standard. Most important for this discussion is Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.51 In that case, the Court upheld
a professional regulation requiring that lawyers who advertise services based on
contingent fee rates disclose whether those rates were calculated before or after the
deduction of court costs and expenses.52 Zauderer’s ads did not explain that even

46. For a thoughtful discussion of the contrasts, see Amar & Brownstein, supra note 24,
at 8 (“It simply makes no sense to argue that conventional free speech doctrine can be
employed in compelled speech cases in remotely the same way it is applied in cases involving
restrictions on speech.”). These commentators also suggest that it may be less useful to think
about government compelled speech as viewpoint based or not, and instead focus on “whether
the government’s message is a political message or an abstract ideological statement, on the
one hand, rather than a factual (albeit contested) assertion, on the other.” Id. at 29.
47. The matter of whether the application of strict scrutiny is, for all intents and purposes,
tantamount to a conclusion that a law is constitutionally invalid is the subject of ongoing
debate. Compare Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972), with Adam
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006).
48. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). In fact,
commentators generally suggest that the strict scrutiny standard in First Amendment
jurisprudence did not emerge until the 1950s. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the
Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 364–68 (2006).
49. Robert Post, NIFLA and the Construction of Compelled Speech Doctrine, 97 IND. L.J.
1071, 1079 (2022) (observing that the Court’s decision in Barnette does not ask whether the
flag salute statute was narrowly tailored).
50. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
51. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
52. Id. at 651–53.
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though unsuccessful clients would not have to pay legal fees, they would still be
liable for paying such costs.53 The rules represented an overtly content-based speech
compulsion, but the Court applied a deferential standard of review. As it noted,
We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the
advertiser’s First Amendment rights at all. We recognize that unjustified
or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First
Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. But we hold that
an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing
deception of consumers.54
This standard is notable for the absence of any descriptors suggesting that courts
should undertake anything more than a deferential review of the laws in question.55
It also is notable in contrast to the intermediate scrutiny test the Zauderer Court
applied to other aspects of the professional conduct rules that restricted, rather than
compelled, what lawyers could say in their commercial advertisements.56 Those
regulations were examined under the Court’s commercial speech standard.57 But as
discussed in more detail below, the Court’s most recent pronouncement in NIFLA
applied intermediate scrutiny (while reserving the possibility that strict scrutiny
might apply) to invalidate California’s FACT Act.
II. COMPELLED FACTUAL STATEMENTS
In recent decades, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have produced few
cases involving compelled ideological speech, perhaps because the signals from
Barnette and Wooley are so clear and, for the most part, well settled.58 Legislators
and regulators therefore may be deterred from enacting such requirements.59 Instead,

53. Id. at 650.
54. Id. at 651 (emphasis added).
55. As Post has observed, “Zauderer does not employ the specific vocabulary of ‘rational
basis’ review, which would have suggested extreme judicial deference. It instead adopts
terminology that unequivocally locates judicial review further toward the deferential end of
the spectrum than the intermediate scrutiny authorized by Central Hudson.” Post, supra note
24, at 883; see also Clay Calvert, Wither Zauderer, Blossom Heightened Scrutiny? How the
Supreme Court’s 2018 Rulings in Becerra and Janus Exacerbate Problems with CompelledSpeech Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1403–04 (2019).
56. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637–49.
57. Id. at 638 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.C.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
58. Although there may be disagreements about the reasons these examples of compelled
speech are unconstitutional, the majority of commentary seems to agree that in most instances
they violate the Constitution. But see Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 147 (2006) (arguing that there is no constitutional justification for invalidating
laws that compel speech).
59. Though they have not been deterred entirely. See, e.g., Lane v. Owens, Civil Action
No. 03-B-1544 (PAC) (D. Colo. 2003) (invalidating state Pledge of Allegiance requirement
for students and teachers that failed to exempt objectors on nonreligious ideological grounds);

366027-ILJ 97-3_Text.indd 94

5/5/22 2:58 PM

2022]

COMPELLED SPEECH & REGULATORY STATE

893

the doctrine’s application has migrated toward other types of compelled speech and
association that touch on slightly different First Amendment concerns. The doctrine
has also been increasingly applied to government compelled statements of fact.
One might think that First Amendment law would draw a fairly clear distinction
between compelled statements of ideological belief and mandatory disclosure of
facts, but that has not been the case. That is not to say that the compulsion of factual
statements could never implicate First Amendment speech and autonomy concerns,
but the interests are fundamentally different, precisely because they are statements
about facts rather than ideas. Notwithstanding the Court’s language in Riley, which
suggests some equivalence between compelled ideological speech and mandatory
disclosures of fact,60 the speech interests are not identical. As Robert Post has noted,
For purposes of First Amendment doctrine, there is a constitutional
symmetry between restrictions on public discourse and compulsions to
participate in public discourse. But this symmetry does not exist within
the domain of commercial speech. Because the constitutional value of
commercial speech lies in the circulation of information, restrictions on
commercial speech and compulsions to engage in commercial speech are
constitutionally asymmetrical. Regulations that force a speaker to
disgorge more information to an audience do not contradict the
constitutional purpose of commercial speech doctrine. They may even
enhance it.61
This argument is confined to compelled factual statements in the commercial
speech context, but as I argue below, the majority of compelled factual statements,
even as applied to individuals and organizations not engaged in commercial speech,
enhance the universe of communication by providing more information, while not
implicating the same speech harms associated with compelled ideological
statements.
A. The Ubiquity of State Compelled Factual Speech
Understanding the ubiquity of compelled factual disclosures in the modern
regulatory state requires at least a brief survey of the range of such requirements.
Businesses, institutions, and other organizations are subject to a comprehensive suite
of regulations requiring them to publicly disseminate factual information.
A wide range of licensed professionals in most states are required to display their
official licenses to practice in their offices in a “conspicuous” location.62 Health care

Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616, 623–36 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 381 F.3d 172 (3d
Cir. 2004) (invalidating state Pledge of Allegiance law because it required schools to notify
parents of their children’s objections to reciting the Pledge). The author discloses that he was
lead counsel for the plaintiffs in the Lane case.
60. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988).
61. Post, supra note 24, at 877; see also Post, supra note 49, at 1073 (“Restrictions on
commercial speech impede [an information] function whereas the mandated disclosure of
commercial information advances it.”); Corbin, supra note 4, at 1302 (discussing the
enhancement of listeners’ autonomy interests from some types of compelled disclosures).
62. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-275-117 (optometrists); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-28.5-
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providers in every state must secure informed consent from their patients before
performing procedures, which by definition requires the providers to inform patients
about health risks associated with such procedures and the availability of alternative
treatments.63
Federal securities law includes a range of mandatory disclosures associated with
corporate securities.64 Yet, such regulations are not even considered to fall within the
coverage of the First Amendment.65
Employers in interstate commerce must comply with a number of federal
regulations requiring them to post notices in their workplaces that inform workers
about their legal rights regarding labor, working conditions, safety, and other aspects
of their employment. As one example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
mandates that employers
shall post and keep posted a notice or notices, to be furnished by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of
Labor, informing employees of the protections and obligations provided
for in the Act, and that for assistance and information, including copies
of the Act and of specific safety and health standards, employees should
contact the employer or the nearest office of the Department of Labor.66
Another example is the requirement under the Americans with Disabilities Act that
employers post relevant provisions of the rights protected under that law.67 Many
states’ laws require employers to post information about wages and other conditions
of employment.68
Perhaps the most widely recognized compelled factual statement is the federal
law requiring cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products to bear health warnings on

1-35 (plumbing contractors); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 41/10-30 (funeral directors and
embalmers); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1933 (pharmacists); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 317-A:11
(dentists).
63. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243 (1972) (“[A]s an integral part of the
physician’s overall obligation to the patient there is a duty of reasonable disclosure of the
available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of the dangers inherently and
potentially involved in each.”).
64. Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional
Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 641–42 (2006) (“[N]ot only
do the securities laws and the rules promulgated by the SEC both compel and prohibit
corporate speech, but they regulate the content, form, and scope of corporate communications
as well.” (footnote omitted)).
65. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1780 (2004).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.2(a)(1) (2021). At least one court has rejected a free speech
challenge to the OSHA posting requirement. Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 519
F.2d 84, 89 (5th Cir. 1975). For a partial list of similar requirements, see Helen Norton, Truth
and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV.
31, 32–33 (2016).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12115.
68. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-364; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/40; W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-9.
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their packaging and in advertising for such products.69 Similarly, manufacturers of
pharmaceuticals must include in their packaging information such as the particular
drug’s generic name as well as use and safety information.70 Another common
federal regulation comes from the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which
requires specific warning labels on products that are “extremely flammable,
corrosive, or highly toxic.”71
Similarly, food producers must include on their packaging nutritional
information, the total number of calories, and the amount of fats, sugar, fiber, and
protein (to name a few) contained in their products.72 Local jurisdictions typically
require that restaurants prominently display their most recent grade from health
inspectors.73
The businesses, professionals, and others who must disclose these facts might
sometimes, and even frequently, disagree with the need to provide them to
consumers. Under the NIFLA intermediate scrutiny standard, they could assert that
despite the objective truth of these facts (e.g., the number of calories in a candy bar),
the facts are not uncontroversial because the regulated parties dispute the necessity
and value of their disclosure. They might even argue that including these facts
ultimately misleads, rather than informs, consumers.74
Although it is not the focus of this Essay, individuals are also subject to a wide
array of factual disclosure requirements, ranging from reporting the amount and
sources of income on their tax returns,75 to submitting information as part of state
licensing processes (driver’s licenses, hunting licenses, gun licenses),76 to disclosing
current home address information on sex offender registries.77 Many such
requirements are also routine and do not have substantial free speech implications.
But if the NIFLA standard were extended to such laws, some of the same arguments
could be made about the degree to which such facts are controversial. For example,
why aren’t laws requiring tax protestors to disclose their income a form of compelled
speech because the legitimacy and scope of the tax system is controversial? Having
said that, there may be some circumstances in which a compelled factual disclosure
law’s impact on the personal dignity and privacy interests of an individual may be

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 4402.
21 U.S.C. § 352; 15 U.S.C. § 1472.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(C).
21 U.S.C. § 343(q).
See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH, REQUIREMENTS FOR POSTING LETTER GRADE
CARDS (2011), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doh/downloads/pdf/rii/rii-grade-posting-faq.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HLL6-W7X7].
74. Or the speaker might contend that the controversiality of the facts and their inaccuracy
overlap. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 895 (9th Cir.
2017) (concluding that city ordinance requiring manufacturers of sugar-sweetened beverages
to state that drinking such beverages “contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay” was
problematic because the factual accuracy of the warning is disputed), aff’d on reh’g en banc,
916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1995).
76. See, e.g., MASS. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERVS., MASSACHUSETTS RESIDENT
LTC/FID/MACHINE GUN APPLICATION (2015), https://www.mass.gov/doc/resident-firearmslicense-application/download [https://perma.cc/FM3R-8LQG].
77. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 740 F.3d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 2014).

366027-ILJ 97-3_Text.indd 97

5/5/22 2:58 PM

896

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:881

materially different from those at stake when the government requires businesses or
organizations to make factual statements, therefore requiring a different analysis that
is beyond the scope of this Essay.78
At the same time, I do not mean to be making an argument that limits application
of a deferential standard of review only to compelled factual disclosures in the
commercial speech context. Because of the very ubiquity of legally required fact
disclosures, they may arise in a number of different contexts that would not
technically qualify as commercial speech under the Court’s definitions of such
speech.79 And I would argue that in the vast majority of contexts, as in the case of
commercial disclosures, such individual disclosures do not implicate important
expressive liberty concerns. But I leave the full exploration of that for another day.
B. NIFLA’s Uncontroversial Fact Standard and Standard Government Regulations
NIFLA involved a constitutional challenge to the California Reproductive
Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency (FACT) Act, a
law that was enacted to address self-styled crisis pregnancy centers, places that
offered pregnancy-related services, but were operated by organizations with the goal
of discouraging and preventing women from seeking abortions.80 FACT imposed
two separate notice requirements for unlicensed and licensed crisis pregnancy
centers. Licensed centers, which were authorized under California law to perform
some types of medical care, were required to post and disseminate a governmentwritten notice indicating that the State offered free or low-cost access to family
planning services, including abortion, and listing the telephone number of the local
county’s social services office.81 This notice had to be posted in the waiting room
and printed and distributed to all clients, or provided in digital form, upon check-in.82
The Court called this the “licensed notice.”
Unlicensed centers, which were not authorized to provide medical care, but could
offer pregnancy-related services such as ultrasounds and pregnancy testing, were
required to post a notice indicating that they were “not licensed as a medical facility
by the State of California” and that they did not have on site any provider of medical
services.83 The “unlicensed notice” had to be at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches (the size

78. For example, in a recent case, transgender persons successfully sued to compel
government officials to correct their birth certificates to accurately reflect their gender identity.
Arroyo Gonzalez v. Rossello Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D.P.R. 2018). Though the case
was decided on privacy grounds, the plaintiffs also asserted a compelled speech claim, arguing
that the refusal to allow changes to gender identity on their birth certificates was a form of
compelled factual speech forcing them to identify as the wrong gender. See Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Arroyo Gonzalez, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327 (No.
3:17-cv-01457-CCC), 2017 WL 6398344. Perhaps such a claim, however, might turn on
whether the underlying fact was undisputed, rather than on whether it was “controversial.”
79. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 1285 (noting the difficulty in distinguishing commercial
from noncommercial speech under the Court’s multiple definitions of the former).
80. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018).
81. Id. at 2369.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2370.
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of a standard piece of paper), posted “conspicuously” at the center’s entrance and in
at least one waiting area on site, and included in all advertising materials.84
One licensed and one unlicensed crisis pregnancy center sued to challenge the
FACT Act as a violation of their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In a
5-4 decision, the Supreme Court invalidated both provisions of the law as a form of
compelled speech. The Court first dispensed with the State’s argument that the
licensed notice should be upheld under diminished First Amendment standards
applicable to the regulation of professional speech. Disputing that there was a
separate standard,85 the Court stated that it had been deferential to regulations of
professional speech in only two limited contexts. First, citing Zauderer, it stated that
a more deferential standard applied to some laws that require professionals to
disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their “commercial speech.”86
Second, it noted that its precedents had permitted states to regulate professional
conduct that “incidentally involves speech,”87 citing its decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.88
The Court further distinguished Zauderer by claiming that it was limited to
commercial advertising and that the law in question there required only the disclosure
of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” about the lawyer’s services.89
The decision also found that the licensed notice provision did not apply to the
services provided by the crisis pregnancy centers, but the FACT Act, in contrast,
“requires these clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored services—
including abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”90
With regard to the unlicensed notice, the State argued that it was required to
ensure that pregnant women knew when they were receiving care from a licensed
medical professional.91 Here, the Court observed that even under Zauderer,
compelled factual disclosures must not be “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”92 But
then, rather facilely, the decision went on to cite to other cases applying intermediate
scrutiny, which requires that the harm identified by the state must be real, not
hypothetical, and that the relevant regulation must be no broader than necessary to
address such harm.93 As discussed earlier, however, Zauderer applies a much more
deferential reasonableness standard that is starkly different from heightened scrutiny.

84. Id.
85. In fact, the Court’s professional speech cases apply several different standards
depending on how the regulation operates. See Rebecca Aviel & Alan K. Chen, Lawyer
Speech, Investigative Deception, and the First Amendment, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 1267.
86. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
87. Id.
88. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). This was a
puzzling characterization of at least part of the Pennsylvania law upheld in Casey, which
required physicians to provide specified information to women seeking abortions and the
securing of informed consent, a classic form of state compelled factual statement. See 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3205.
89. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of the
Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 2377.
92. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
93. Id.
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But suggesting that it need not decide whether Zauderer applied, the Court held that
the State had offered nothing but a hypothetical justification for the unlicensed notice
provision and struck it down.94 This part of the opinion seems to be missing a step in
the analysis, because hypothetical justifications are ordinarily sufficient to uphold
laws under deferential standards of scrutiny, so the Court appeared to be applying
intermediate scrutiny while disclaiming the need to decide whether the more relaxed
Zauderer standard ought to apply.
There are all sorts of problems with the decision in NIFLA. But perhaps the most
alarming flaw in its analysis is the majority’s failure to elaborate on what it meant by
labeling a compelled disclosure as involving an uncontroversial fact.95 Prior to
NIFLA, the lower courts struggled to identify a meaningful approach to defining what
makes a fact “controversial.” In one view, one which closely resembles the NIFLA
majority’s view, facts are controversial simply when they relate or pertain to a public
controversy.96 But as I argue below, at some level every area to which government
regulation extends can be viewed as controversial, which would make this standard
too broad by any stretch of the imagination. Other courts have taken the view that
factual and uncontroversial mean the same thing, that if something is not factual, it
is thereby controversial.97 This understanding of Zauderer, however, would render
the word “uncontroversial” completely superfluous. Still others contend that
uncontroversial means uncontested, accurate, or “true.”98 Again, this seems
duplicative, rendering the “uncontroversial” element meaningless as part of the legal
test.
Indeed, facts should not be, in and of themselves, controversial, but can only
become controversial either because people disagree about their truth or because the
context in which they arise or the way they are characterized makes their presentation
controversial. The first of these scenarios is not present in NIFLA. The plaintiffs did
not claim that they disbelieved that the State provided free and low-cost family
planning services, including abortion; they disagreed that abortion should be legal at
all. But one can imagine many scenarios in which a regulated party might disagree
about the objective truth of a compelled disclosure. If that were the standard,
however, then any regulated party could simply assert that the facts contained in the
mandatory disclosure are not true, thereby converting them into controversial facts
and leading to heightened scrutiny review. As elaborated on below, this type of selfinterested action cannot be the thing that makes a fact controversial.99
In this way, NIFLA’s approach problematizes compelled speech doctrine in a
manner that could well be exacerbated in the current political climate. It is not simply
that the law cannot tolerate a regime under which a regulated party can escape

94. Id.
95. For a detailed analysis of seven different possible interpretations of the phrase “purely
factual and uncontroversial,” see Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 747–67.
96. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2015). For a
survey of different approaches to the question, see Haan, supra note 9, at 1380–87.
97. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 630 (D. Vt. 2015).
98. See, e.g., CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 158 F. Supp. 3d 897, 904
(N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 854 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018), and
aff'd, 928 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2019).
99. See infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
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compelled disclosure requirements simply by objecting to them (and thereby making
them “controversial”), it is also that we are currently living in an era where the very
concept of objective truth is under attack. This era of epistemic anarchy presents
enormous challenges for public discourse in general but, when combined with the
NIFLA standard, could lead to an onslaught of legal challenges to routine regulatory
disclosure laws. Moreover, it is a problem that seems likely to persist given all of the
structural reasons in our information environment that have led to these types of
disputes about truth. Some of those reasons are doctrinal, given the difficulties under
current First Amendment law with attempts to regulate fake news and other types of
disinformation.100 Others have to do with the manner in which people choose sources
of information based on their ideological predispositions, driven by confirmation
bias and motivated reasoning.101 And, as I have recently argued, there are reasons to
believe that the disinformation problem may be even more strongly embedded in that
listeners often seek out false information because it promotes a kind of expressive,
experiential autonomy and social cohesion with like-minded thinkers.102
How might this play out in a compelled factual disclosure case? Suppose that the
Federal Department of Transportation issued regulations to car manufacturers
requiring that owner’s manuals of fossil fuel-based vehicles contain the following
statement: “The vast majority of scientific evidence suggests that climate change is
in part caused by human activity, including the operation of vehicles fueled by
gasoline. The U.S. Department of Transportation therefore urges drivers to minimize
their use of such vehicles where possible.” Both of these statements are objectively
true and as Clay Calvert suggests, “[o]bjectively true facts . . . are not subject for
debate in the marketplace of ideas.”103 But what if a factual issue has become
politicized to the point where a significant percentage of Americans do not believe
something that is overwhelmingly considered by experts to be true? Turning back to
my hypothetical, suppose a lot of Americans do not believe that human activity
causes climate change.104 If, as a society, we cannot agree about basic facts, such as
who won a closely watched presidential election or whether masks can reduce the
spread of a highly contagious virus, it begs the question whether we can distinguish
an argument over a fact from an ideological dispute, thus blurring the line between
compelled ideological speech and compelled fact disclosures. These types of
disputes are all the more likely because of the related problem that many people now
mistrust government officials and elite experts in their fields.105 But it cannot be that

100. Alan K. Chen, Free Speech, Rational Deliberation, and Some Truths About Lies, 62
WM. & MARY L. REV. 357 (2020).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Calvert, supra note 55, at 1414.
104. Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, How Americans See Climate Change and the
Environment in 7 Charts, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/04/21/how-americans-see-climate-change-and-the-environment-in-7-charts/
[https://perma.cc/NC2Z-QME2].
105. Rosa Brooks, Opinion, Competence Is Critical for Democracy. Let’s Redefine It.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/15/opinion/competence-iscritical-for-democracy-lets-redefine-it.html [https://perma.cc/M5VN-KUT6].
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simply because a noticeable portion of the population does not believe a fact that it
automatically becomes “controversial” as that term is used in NIFLA.106
Indeed, Sarah Haan has insightfully pointed out that the current doctrine’s
limitation on laws that require anything but “purely factual and uncontroversial”
disclosures is a sign that we are living in a post-truth information economy, “a system
of information exchange that discourages evidence-based reasoning, while
facilitating decision-making based on simple heuristics such as emotional reasoning,
brand loyalty, and groupthink.”107 In her account, the current compelled speech
doctrine is a component of the post-truth information economy. As she argues, “by
treating controversiality as a problem per se, the Zauderer approach calibrates the
flow of disclosure information based purely on how that information will affect its
audience, and in reverse—constricting the flow of useful information on matters of
the highest public interest.”108
But perhaps the problem goes even one step beyond the problem of a post-truth
society. In addition to what might be called an epistemological crisis, there is also a
small, though growing, segment of the public that fundamentally questions the very
role of government. Current fringe groups, such as the Sovereign Citizens
Movement, though small, do not believe in the legitimacy of government at all and
actively oppose taxes, the courts, law enforcement, and other institutions.109 While
that is an extreme example, a much wider segment of the public is opposed to or
skeptical of governmental institutions in a manner that would suggest they believe
that any state compulsion of truthful factual statements could be understood as
controversial because the very idea of government is controversial. Polls show that
an alarming eighty percent of Americans trust the federal government to do what is
right only some of the time or never.110

106. Here it is worth noting that there are nuances about what facts are true, how we define
knowledge, and how we “know” things. As Jane Bambauer has observed, free speech doctrine
has not sufficiently dealt with these nuances. Jane R. Bambauer, Snake Oil Speech, 93 WASH.
L. REV. 73, 76 (2018). She suggests that knowledge can be broken down into “[a]ccepted
knowledge,” which “can be verified using a high standard of evidence” and are “verifiable and
valid to the relevant community of experts” and “[c]ontested knowledge,” which is “known to
be presently unverifiable and subject to debate and speculation by the relevant expert
community.” Id. Contested knowledge, she continues, “may be substantiated by empirical
evidence, but not enough to have itself accepted as irrefutable.” Id. Of course, as I argue here,
there is substantial conflict in beliefs even about accepted knowledge. On how we know things
to be true, see generally Philip Fernbach & Steven Sloman, Opinion, Why We Believe Obvious
Untruths, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/opinion/
sunday/why-we-believe-obvious-untruths.html [https://perma.cc/8JV4-2F9Z].
107. Haan, supra note 9, at 1369.
108. Id. at 1388 (emphasis in original).
109. Sovereign Citizens Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/
fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement [https://perma.cc/6SHTWTDE].
110. Americans’ Views of Government: Low Trust, but Some Positive Performance
Ratings, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/
2020/09/14/americans-views-of-government-low-trust-but-some-positive-performanceratings/ [https://perma.cc/D8U8-AWH5].
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What about the second scenario? Can facts become controversial because the
context in which they are discussed or presented makes them so? This would appear
to be what the NIFLA majority was concerned about in its opinion. There is no
dispute that the topic of abortion is controversial, and NIFLA implies that even
requiring crisis pregnancy centers to note that abortion is provided by the State in
some circumstances harms their speech interests in ways comparable to compulsion
of a purely ideological statement. While it is certainly possible that some state
compelled factual disclosures might be viewed as controversial because of the
context in which they are required or the words used to characterize otherwise
objective facts, the NIFLA Court goes much further than that. As Claudia Haupt and
Wendy Parmet have observed, “it seems that [Justice Thomas’s] interpretation of
‘uncontroversial’ means that as long as a topic is broadly controversial (such as
abortion), any information relating to it, even if it is factual and accurate (such as the
existence of free or low-cost family planning programs in California), could be
deemed controversial.”111
I will return to this topic in Part III. For now, let’s examine such claims in relation
to the earlier discussion of the speech harms associated with compelled ideological
speech and assess whether the FACT Act or other similar laws compelling truthful
factual disclosures compromise those interests.112 That is, does requiring the licensed
and unlicensed notice trigger the viewpoint discrimination problem, the
misattribution problem, or the autonomy problem?
As I’ve described it, the viewpoint discrimination problem arises when the State
forces people to express things they do not truly believe. This interest is strongly
implicated by the compulsion of an ideological statement. But as Professor Calvert
has observed: “Unlike the seminal right-not-to-speak cases of Barnette and Wooley,
California did not compel the centers to express a viewpoint, adopt a position, or
convey a state-sponsored philosophy, maxim, or creed.”113 The best case for the First
Amendment’s application to the compelled factual disclosure here is that forcing the
centers to post the State’s script directly contradicts their views on abortion or
perhaps dilutes their own message by forcing them to acknowledge that abortion is
not only legal, but also funded by the State. But the centers’ complaint is not that
they do not believe those facts, but rather that they disagree with the state of the law
that makes those facts possible. That seems fundamentally distinct from being
required to espouse ideological agreement with the opposite of one’s own beliefs, as
in a law that required the centers to state that abortion is “morally justified” and its
availability “empowers women’s autonomy” or is “good public health policy.”

111. Claudia E. Haupt & Wendy E. Parmet, Public Health Originalism and the First
Amendment, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 255 (2021) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted);
see also Calvert, supra note 55, at 1410 (“Zauderer mentioned ‘uncontroversial information,’
not an uncontroversial topic. Additionally, and problematically, what constitutes a
‘controversial’ topic is subjective, and Thomas offered no guidance for how it might be
established.”).
112. See Post, supra note 49, at 1075 (suggesting that in understanding compelled speech
doctrine, “our first task must be to ascertain the exact constitutional values that compelled
speech doctrine ought to be fashioned to protect”).
113. Calvert, supra note 55, at 1407.
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To the extent that there is a misattribution problem with compelled factual
disclosures, there are relatively easy ways around it. The best argument for
misattribution would be that by forcing the centers to speak about the availability of
abortion, they may be wrongly understood to advocate for abortion as not just a legal
option, but a desirable one.114 That does not seem to be the case here. First, the
regulated parties most likely to object to compelled factual disclosure are the very
organizations for whom misattribution is most implausible. Their very distaste in
reciting the words strongly incentivizes them to take steps to disassociate themselves
with the message. There was nothing in the FACT Act that prevented licensed or
unlicensed centers from posting their own notice alongside the State-required one
that both indicated that they objected to being required to post such a notice and
urged their clients not to pursue the state options. They could post a sign that said,
“Abortion is murder!” next to the required notices as well. The ability to engage in
counterspeech also mitigates the viewpoint discrimination problem. As Seana
Shiffrin has observed,
From a free speech perspective, what matters for organizations is not that
they agree with every regulatory rule that applies to them, including
regulatory rules involving speech, but that they have sufficient breathing
space in a substantial forum to articulate their own message in a way that
may be understood as their own.115
Unless the government regulation directly forbids counterspeech, that space should
be adequately available under compelled factual speech regulations.116
States, in turn, could minimize the misattribution problem by drafting disclosure
requirements with precise language that directly attributes the notice to the
government. Consider, for example, a law that required the centers to post a notice
that said “The contents of this notice are from the State of California” before its
substantive portions. As one example, San Francisco enacted an ordinance requiring
that sugar-sweetened beverages sold in the city contain the following statement on
their labels: “WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to
obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay. This is a message from the City and County of
San Francisco.”117 Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that a trade association’s
motion for preliminary injunction barring enforcement of this ordinance should have
been granted, it did so not on the ground that it was controversial but on the theory

114. The Court concluded that “the licensed notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of [the
centers’] speech.” Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2371 (2018). But because, as I describe here, the law does not affect the centers’ ability to
engage in counterspeech, I take this statement to refer to dilution of the message.
115. Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 765.
116. To some degree, this concern is also already captured by Zauderer’s requirement that
the regulation not be unduly burdensome. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct.
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). For example, if a regulation required that the compelled
factual disclosure consume ninety percent of the area where the speaker is communicating (an
advertisement, a candy bar wrapper, etc.), there might literally not be any space for
counterspeech.
117. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE § 4203(a) (2015) (repealed 2021) (emphasis added).
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that it was unduly burdensome.118 To some degree that may have been a way to
circumvent the fact that the message was clearly designated as coming from the
government, and not the beverage producer. Indeed, an alternative approach to the
current doctrine would be to treat mandatory disclosures as government speech,
which is much less constrained by the First Amendment than government regulations
under current doctrine.119 On at least one occasion, the Court has done just that.120
Finally, there are not as many concerns that factual disclosures, as opposed to
ideological speech, will deprive regulated parties of their autonomy. To the extent
that compelled factual speech infringes on dignitary interests, at the very least those
interests are less of a concern where the regulated party is not an individual, but a
business or organization. While the latter unquestionably enjoy First Amendment
rights, dignitary interests have more to do with the autonomy of beings than
entities.121 If the autonomy problem is that rote recitation of the government’s script
will, over time, inculcate the government’s values, thus interfering with the regulated
party’s deliberative processes and influencing their beliefs, businesses and
organizations do not engage in deliberative processes independent of those who work
for them.122 And, again, the parties most likely to object to compelled factual speech
are also the least likely to be influenced by its recitation. The wide availability of
counterspeech makes this an even more remote possibility.
Thus, apparently what makes a fact “controversial” under NIFLA’s formulation is
not that there is any question about its truthfulness or validity, but that the regulated
entity disagrees with either the underlying regulation or with the more general state
of the law, and therefore the state of affairs, that allows that law to be enacted.
Understood in this manner, the NIFLA standard seems to empower the regulated
party to determine whether the fact is sufficiently controversial to justify judicial
review under strict scrutiny. That would be an absurd way to go about assessing the
validity of state compelled factual disclosures because regulated parties are
frequently, if not always, going to object to such regulations, which they are likely
to view as adverse to their idiosyncratic interests. As Professor Post has succinctly
pointed out, “Plainly a mandated disclosure cannot become controversial merely
because a speaker objects to making it.”123 Professor Shiffrin similarly notes that

118. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2019).
119. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (describing
“latitude which may exist for restrictions on speech where the government's own message is
being delivered”).
120. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). It is worth noting, however,
that the government expressing its own message directly, such as by renting a billboard to post
that message, is still analytically distinct from forcing a private speaker to post that message
on its billboard. For an interesting approach that suggests, in part, considering whether the
government is trying to use private speakers to convey its message to avoid the political and
economic costs of speaking directly through government channels, see Amar & Brownstein,
supra note 24, at 7.
121. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 24, at 24; Corbin, supra note 4, at 1314–16, 1346.
122. But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 709 (2014) (stating that
for purposes of federal statute protecting religious freedom, corporations may “exercise”
religion).
123. Post, supra note 24, at 910; see also Haan, supra note 9, at 1385.
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“[i]nstitutional actors cannot be exempt from every requirement with which they
disagree within a complex, democratic society that protects the rights and interests
of all of its members.”124
Moreover, NIFLA is internally contradictory because of its rather weak attempt to
distinguish the FACT Act from disclosures that have often been required under the
guise of informed consent under state abortion regulations. In Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,125 the Supreme Court upheld multiple
provisions of a Pennsylvania statute that imposed several speech requirements on
physicians who performed abortions. First, doctors were obligated to inform women
seeking abortions about “the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion
and of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn child.’”126 They
were also required to inform women of the availability of printed materials published
by the State that described the fetus and to provide these women with information
about medical assistance for childbirth, the availability of child support, and a list of
agencies that provided adoption and other alternatives to abortion.127 In addition to
asserting that the law violated Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, the
challengers argued that the law represented a type of compelled speech in violation
of the physicians’ First Amendment rights. On the due process claim, the plurality
said that “[w]e also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a
woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the
consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to
her health.”128 In rejecting the speech claim, the plurality noted that although doctors
have the right not to speak, this law only affected that right “as part of the practice
of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.”129 In
NIFLA, the Court distinguished this aspect of Casey, contending that the FACT Act
was not an informed consent provision or any other type of professional conduct
regulation.130 But this formalist distinction does not detract from the argument that
the Pennsylvania law at issue in Casey compelled statements of fact about a topic
that was, as the NIFLA majority itself admits, “anything but” uncontroversial.131

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 765.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 881.
Id.
Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
Id. at 884.
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018).
Id. at 2372. As Justice Breyer asserted in his dissent,

If a State can lawfully require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion about
adoption services, why should it not be able, as here, to require a medical
counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other reproductive healthcare
about childbirth and abortion services? As the question suggests, there is no
convincing reason to distinguish between information about adoption and
information about abortion in this context.
Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Or perhaps the reason is sub rosa. As Ruth Colker points
out, “[T]he Casey/Becerra distinction seems to provide more speech protection when the state
is endorsing an antiabortion rather than a pro-choice perspective, even though the application
of free speech doctrine is supposed to be content neutral.” Ruth Colker, Uninformed Consent,
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The Casey comparison reflects another important difference between compelled
ideological speech and mandated disclosures of truthful facts. With regard to the First
Amendment interests implicated by the latter, it is important to note that the speaker’s
interest in not speaking is in direct conflict with the listeners’ interests in hearing the
speech. Listeners’ interests in this context include the right to be informed of facts
relevant to their decision making. This is no less true in the context of a consumer
food purchase than in the case of a person pursuing pregnancy-related services. Thus,
to the extent the First Amendment protects the speaker’s right to not speak, it
inherently also diminishes the universe of information available to the listener. This
is particularly concerning when the speaker is more powerful than the listeners, as is
often the case when the government compels factual disclosures. As Helen Norton
has observed, “Powerful speakers’ nondisclosures also threaten listeners’ interests
while enhancing their own . . . . For this reason, more information—so long as it’s
accurate and material—is often better for listeners.”132 The listeners’ interests in
compelled factual speech cases have been substantially underappreciated and should
be a critical factor in evaluating the constitutionality of laws requiring disclosure of
truthful facts.133
It is also worth noting that another interest in these circumstances may go
unnoticed. In the modern regulatory state, disclosure requirements, in addition to
being ubiquitous, are frequently adopted as an alternative to more burdensome, direct
regulations of conduct.134 Such requirements serve to promote transparency, and
perhaps self-regulation and compliance, which may be a more effective regulatory
option, but also a relatively easier one with which to comply. If compelled factual
disclosures are rendered invalid by applying NIFLA’s controversial fact test, the State
may be forced to resort to direct regulatory mechanisms that impair the freedom of
regulated parties just as much as, if not more than, compelled speech laws.
Understood against this backdrop, the Court’s adoption of the “uncontroversial
facts” standard in NIFLA neither makes conceptual sense nor advances critical free
speech interests.135 Indeed, the speech problems associated with compelled factual
speech usually will not rise to the level of compelled ideological statements. In his
dissenting opinion in NIFLA, Justice Breyer noted as much. He wrote that “Where a
State’s requirement to speak ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information’ does
not attempt ‘to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or

101 B.U. L. REV. 431, 452 (2021).
132. Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441, 452–
53 (2019); see also Haan, supra note 9, at 1371–72.
133. See generally Norton, supra note 132; Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in
Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329 (2008).
134. See Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 351, 353 (2011) (“[M]andatory disclosure has become a growing part of the modern
state’s regulatory repertoire. Disclosure mandates, either alongside or in lieu of substantive
mandates, have become important tools in the regulation of securities markets, consumer
product and credit markets, and in the regulation of environmental hazards, health care, food
and drug safety, and education.”).
135. Yet it is highly consequential. As Professor Haan notes, “It is a test with teeth.” Haan,
supra note 9, at 1379.
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other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein,”’ it does not warrant heightened scrutiny.”136
Beyond that, applying heightened scrutiny to state compelled factual statements
threatens to undermine many of the most basic functions of the regulatory state.
Again, Justice Breyer recognized this when he noted that
the majority’s approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over
the constitutional validity of much, perhaps most, government
regulation. Virtually every disclosure law could be considered “content
based,” for virtually every disclosure law requires individuals “to speak
a particular message.” . . . Thus, the majority’s view, if taken literally,
could radically change prior law, perhaps placing much securities law or
consumer protection law at constitutional risk, depending on how
broadly its exceptions are interpreted.137
Indeed, the dangers that compelled speech doctrine could undermine basic forms
of government regulation were recognized long before Justice Breyer. In his
concurring opinion in the flag salute case, Justice Frank Murphy wrote that “The
right of freedom of thought . . . as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action
includes . . . the right to refrain from speaking at all, except in so far as essential
operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society,—
as in the case of compulsion to give evidence in court.”138 Murphy’s statement
foresaw something that few contemporary commentators have emphasized—the
state must sometimes, maybe even frequently, compel speech to maintain the
“essential operations of government.” The Supreme Court’s recent controversial
applications of the compelled speech doctrine have not only been wrongly decided,
but also, taken to their logical extreme, could ultimately lead to the end of the
regulatory state.
None of this is to say that no government compelled factual statement could ever
cause First Amendment harms. The final Part of this Essay explores some limitations
on the general argument that such laws should usually be entitled to great judicial
deference.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON COMPELLED STATEMENTS OF FACT
Though the Court’s attempts to establish a limiting principle for evaluation of
government compelled factual speech in NIFLA were unhelpful, that does not mean
that the law is not in need of one. I have argued that the default rule regarding state
compelled factual statements should be that they do not violate the First Amendment
so long as the facts are objectively true, the disclosure is reasonable in content and
scope, and the publication of the facts advances legitimate state interests. The

136. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Zauderer v. Off. of
Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
137. Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
138. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
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remainder of the discussion addresses in what circumstances the courts should take
a harder look at the relevant provision.
A. Compelled Factual Disclosures in Political Speech
While I have argued that the application of a deferential standard of review should
extend to many types of government compelled factual disclosures, there must be an
exception where the speaker’s expression is purely political or otherwise directed
toward public discourse. The Court acknowledged this in Riley, when it hypothesized
about the First Amendment problems with a law “requiring a speaker favoring a
particular government project to state at the outset of every address the average cost
overruns in similar projects, or a law requiring a speaker favoring an incumbent
candidate to state during every solicitation that candidate's recent travel budget.”139
A comparable exception where factual disclosures might be disallowed would be
necessary for much religious speech as well. Such requirements might improperly
insert the government into an impermissible role of challenging the truthfulness of
religious orthodoxy, where truth might have a very different, spiritual, and faithbased, rather than earthly, meaning.140 In both these instances, there would be a
heightened concern that the government is wandering outside the realm of routine
regulatory actions and attempting to affect the speaker’s message. But as stated
earlier, Riley cannot also mean that strict scrutiny must apply to all laws requiring
truthful factual disclosures.
B. Words that Characterize Facts
Another possible situation where a higher level of scrutiny might be necessary is
where the government requires speakers to use specific language that, as opposed to
being a bare statement of fact, characterizes the facts in a way that makes their use
controversial. For example, what if the Pennsylvania abortion law at issue in Casey
required doctors to inform patients that “The State of Pennsylvania wishes to make
you aware that there are a number of state services available to pregnant women as
an alternative to murdering one’s unborn child.”? The State’s requirement of the
word “murdering” instead of abortion converts this from a pure factual statement
about available state services to one that characterizes abortion as murder, which is
much more like a compelled ideological statement.
Many of the more recent lower court disputes about compelled factual disclosures
have involved similar examples. In a pre-NIFLA case that tried to apply Zauderer to
a federal compelled fact disclosure, the American Meat Institute challenged a
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture requiring meat products to
be labeled with information about their country of origin.141 Previous cases in the
D.C. Circuit had interpreted Zauderer’s deferential First Amendment test for
government compelled speech that was “purely factual and uncontroversial” to apply

139. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988).
140. Chen, supra note 100, at 406 (observing that religious speech falls within a category
of expression where “what is true is either highly debatable, unverifiable, or subject only to
considerations of faith and value”).
141. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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only where the government’s interest was in preventing consumer deception. Thus,
on compelled speech grounds, the court had invalidated federal laws requiring that
cigarette packages manufactured in the United States bear not just words, but
graphical images depicting the negative health consequences of smoking.142 The
court held that the images, such as a graphic of a man smoking through a tracheotomy
hole, were “inflammatory” and could not be said to “impart purely factual, accurate,
or uncontroversial information to consumers.”143 In another case, the same court
invalidated a statute authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
issue regulations requiring firms that used “conflict minerals” to investigate and
disclose the origin of those minerals.144 Such minerals were those used by armed
groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to finance their war, often through
the extortion of mining operations.145 The general purpose of the requirement was to
inform investors of the source of a regulated business’s revenue. As in the R.J.
Reynolds case, the court struck down the law, observing that:
it is far from clear that the description at issue—whether a product is
“conflict free”—is factual and non-ideological. Products and minerals do
not fight conflicts. The label “conflict free” is a metaphor that conveys
moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires an issuer to tell
consumers that its products are ethically tainted, even if they only
indirectly finance armed groups. An issuer, including an issuer who
condemns the atrocities of the Congo war in the strongest terms, may
disagree with that assessment of its moral responsibility.146
But in American Meat Institute, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled those
prior cases and upheld the country of origin labeling requirement.147 In doing so, it
first rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the more deferential Zauderer test applied only
to factual disclosures designed to prevent consumer deception.148 Thus, the fact that
the government’s asserted interest was not in preventing deception, but in informing
consumers about the sourcing of their food products was substantial enough to justify
the disclosure requirement. Turning to the issue of whether country of origin labeling
was “purely factual and uncontroversial,” the court found that the labeling
information was not “controversial in the sense that it communicates a message that
is controversial for some reason other than dispute about simple factual
accuracy.”149

142. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
143. Id. at 1217. It therefore held that Zauderer did not apply and struck down the
regulation under the intermediate scrutiny standard applied to regulations of commercial
speech. Id.
144. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 362–63 (D.C. Cir. 2014), adhered to on
reh’g, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015), overruled by Am. Meat
Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 371.
147. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
148. Id. at 22.
149. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).

366027-ILJ 97-3_Text.indd 110

5/5/22 2:58 PM

2022]

COMPELLED SPEECH & REGULATORY STATE

909

But let us take seriously the claim that some types of compelled fact disclosures
might be viewed as controversial. For example, one other argument raised by the
plaintiffs in American Meat Institute was that the regulation’s original language
required use of the word “slaughter” in the disclosure (as in, “this product made from
animals slaughtered in Canada”). As the court noted, “we can understand a claim that
‘slaughter,’ used on a product of any origin, might convey a certain innuendo.”150
Ultimately, the court didn’t address this claim because the regulations had been
subsequently modified to allow use of the word “harvested” instead.151 But what if it
hadn’t? Can the government’s prescribed phrasing or characterization of a fact make
it controversial or involve “innuendo” such that the First Amendment concerns
associated with compelled ideological speech become more apparent? The same
claims were made in the case involving graphic health warnings on cigarette
packaging and use of the phrase “conflict minerals” in securities disclosures.
To the extent that the answer is yes, I would argue that the problem is not that the
statements are controversial, but that they are no longer purely factual within the
meaning of Zauderer. By adding descriptive elements to the phrasing that results in
the characterization of the fact, the regulators may violate the First Amendment not
by introducing controversy, but by adding an ideological or value laden element to
the facts. A graphic image of a man smoking through a tracheotomy hole might be
used to create an emotional reaction that would not result from a factual statement
that some smokers require tracheotomies because of the health effects of tobacco. A
statement about a company’s use of “conflict minerals” might imply a moral
judgment that would not be present with a more detailed description of how and
under what circumstances the company’s minerals were obtained. And “slaughtered”
is a characterization of the killing of an animal that suggests a less than humane end
of life.
The point is that describing factual disclosures as “controversial” is not doing any
of the work, here. If anything, it is superfluous, in that if a statement involves not
bare facts, but ideologically influenced characterizations of those facts, it is no longer
purely factual and therefore bleeds over into a form of compelled ideological
statement. Where does that leave us in assessing the Court’s decision in NIFLA? It
would seem that both the unlicensed notice and the licensed notice include bare facts
rather than characterizations of those facts. It is not disputed that California provides
free and low-cost pregnancy services including abortion or that the unlicensed clinics
are, in fact, not licensed to perform medical services. No words included in the
disclosure are tainted with any value-laden language unless one were to argue that
the word “abortion” is in and of itself ideological. In short, applying this analysis,
the disclosure requirements in NIFLA seem even less problematic than the ones at
issue in the D.C. Circuit cases and therefore should have been upheld.
There are at least two critical responses to the suggestion that the characterization
of facts may make those disclosures no longer purely factual, thus removing them
from the category of speech entitled to Zauderer deference.152 First, disputes about
whether a particular characterization is value-laden enough to make it no longer

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. I am grateful to Rebecca Tushnet for raising these serious concerns with me.
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purely factual might simply shift the argument that previously existed over whether
facts are “controversial” to whether the characterization of the facts makes them
value laden. If so, then my suggested approach is different, but not necessarily better,
than the current one. Second, because I argue that the manner in which facts are
required to be characterized may be problematic if they, among other things, evoke
an emotional reaction in some listeners, I may be wrongly discounting the role of
emotion in individual deliberation.153 As Rebecca Tushnet argues, “When the
government can otherwise constitutionally mandate disclosure, the fact that these
disclosures have emotional resonance is not an independent constitutional barrier.”154
If that is the case, then my “characterization of facts” approach may rely on an
incomplete (and perhaps also inappropriately gendered) understanding of how
listeners process information.
As to the first critique, I concede that there will continue to be hard cases in which
the parties will dispute whether a mandated disclosure uses language that
characterize facts in a value-laden or quasi-ideological manner. Thus, in the graphic
image tobacco warnings case or the country of origin food source dispute, the courts
would be deciding whether the compelled speech was a characterization of a fact
instead of whether the disclosure was “controversial,” thus making little progress in
clarifying the doctrine. However, I do think that there would be fewer disputes under
my suggested approach. One of the problems with the NIFLA majority’s analysis is
that invoking the Zauderer test made it too easy for the majority to conclude that the
disclosures were “controversial,” not because the facts were disputed or
controversial, but because the topic of abortion is controversial.155 Most, though
certainly not all, government compelled disclosures are comprised of fairly
straightforward, sterile statements of information, but many of those may touch on
controversial topics because, as I argue above, the value of the regulation itself is
contested. And to reiterate, if that is all it takes for a regulated party to have a
compelled disclosure invalidated then virtually all such regulations are doomed. But
requiring the challenger to show that the manner in which the facts are characterized
converts them from facts into ideological statements presents a higher threshold for
compelled speech claims. As I have just argued, nothing in the FACT Act’s
disclosure language can be reasonably viewed as an ideologically tainted
characterization of facts—a facility is either licensed or it is not.
As to the second critique, I completely agree that emotion is an important part of
deliberation.156 But such claims are more directly applicable to whether particular
forms of expression have value and are therefore covered by the First Amendment.157

153. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, More Than a Feeling: Emotion and the First
Amendment, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2392 (2014).
154. Id. at 2393.
155. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
156. Tushnet, supra note 153, at 2407 (noting that courts’ distrust of emotional impact of
disclosures “conflicts with decades of research on cognition and decisionmaking, which has
shown that emotion, including general positive or negative feelings about a topic, is ‘vital to
reasoned deliberation’”).
157. See Chen, supra note 100, at 402–16 (arguing that fake news has value to its listeners
not because it promotes rational deliberation, but because it facilitates expressive experiential
autonomy and social cohesion).
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In contrast, in mandatory factual disclosure cases, unlike cases involving the
suppression of speech, the question isn’t whether the speech has value, but whether
the government can compel private speakers to carry the government’s message. As
I have argued, that is more problematic if the message is ideological rather than
factual, and value-laden, sometimes emotion-evoking, statements are at least more
like ideological statements than more sterile ones. Moreover, to the extent my
approach limits the government’s power to require speakers to communicate valueladen fact characterizations, it does not completely take emotional appeals out of the
discourse. The government is still completely free to engage in its own speech using
as many graphics, other heuristics, and emotionally imbued expression as it wishes.
C. Unduly Burdensome Factual Disclosures
Another limitation is already addressed by the requirement that disclosures be
reasonable in content and scope. It is not difficult to imagine a regulation that
required the regulated entity to disclose so much factual information that it would be
unduly costly or otherwise burdensome. This limit is already built into the doctrine,
at least in the professional advertising context. In Zauderer, the Court noted that
“unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First
Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”158 It might do so, for
example, because of the sheer cost of compliance. Or the volume of the disclosure
might also reach the point where it crowds out the regulated party’s message or
diminishes opportunities for counterspeech. The NIFLA majority expressed this
concern in discussing the constitutionality of the unlicensed notice. It observed that
As California conceded at oral argument, a billboard for an unlicensed
facility that says ‘Choose Life’ would have to surround that two-word
statement with a 29–word statement from the government, in as many as
13 different languages. In this way, the unlicensed notice drowns out the
facility’s own message.159
Finally, the unreasonableness of the scope of any compelled disclosures might
also be a factor in considering whether the provisions were enacted in good faith.
D. Unreasonableness and Government Bad Faith
To address any legitimate free speech concerns with compelled factual
statements, courts might also look for evidence that the government’s regulation
might be subterfuge for an attempt to undermine the regulated party’s ideological
commitments. This sort of bad faith claim would allow invalidation of the law while
not leading to the undermining of the vast majority of regulatory disclosure
requirements. This might be advanced by the requirement that the disclosure be
reasonable in content. That is, the disclosure must be related to the underlying
purpose of the regulation.

158. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985).
159. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378.
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Suppose, for example, that a state enacted a law requiring that all animal rights
organizations post in their office spaces a sign that displayed accurate information
about the nutritional qualities of different types of meat. The problem here is not that
the fact is uncontroversial (assuming that there are objective assessments of
nutrition). The problem is that the disclosure’s complete lack of germaneness to the
regulated party makes it unreasonable. The animal rights organizations may be
regulated as employers or as advocacy groups, but they are not in the business of
producing, preparing, or selling food products. The disconnection between the
regulation and the regulated party’s operations suggests that something else is going
on, and that the state is simply trying to undermine the organizations’ message and
mission in encouraging people to pursue plant-based diets.
It is important that the doctrine, as developed, accommodate the possibility that
scenarios may exist where the government tries to disguise an effort to compromise
the speaker’s ideological commitments under the guise of compelling purely factual
disclosures, but the general default presumption of deference should be sufficient in
the vast majority of cases.160
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment’s compelled speech doctrine originated as an important
limitation on the government’s power to directly impose ideological orthodoxy on
its citizens. But the doctrine has drifted far afield of this critical function to the point
where disgruntled regulated parties can invoke it to challenge what have traditionally
been understood as routine regulatory disclosures. The majority of such laws, which
do compel the speaker to make factual statements, serve legitimate regulatory
purposes that do not unconstitutionally burden speakers but do promote listeners’
interests in being informed. The Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA is a signal that

160. The combination of these limiting factors may be useful in distinguishing some of the
more transparently anti-abortion messages that some states have adopted as part of their
informed consent laws regarding reproductive health services. For example, South Dakota
enacted a law requiring that as part of the informed consent process, physicians who perform
abortions state, among other things, that an abortion “terminate[s] the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b). As Professor Corbin
has suggested, compulsion of facts can sometimes be linked to government orthodoxy or
intrusions on personal autonomy, thus implicating the types of compelled speech that do raise
First Amendment concerns. Corbin, supra note 4, at 1324–26. While the Eighth Circuit sitting
en banc upheld the South Dakota law against a compelled speech challenge, Planned
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008), there are multiple ways
even under a deferential standard of review to argue for its invalidation. First, it could be
viewed as involving a value-laden characterization of abortion given the highly contested and
contextual meaning of “human life.” Second, it could be viewed as an unduly burdensome
imposition on the listeners’ autonomy. Finally, the way this law and others like it are worded,
it could be argued to be a rather thinly disguised bad faith effort to insert the State’s attempt
to influence women not to have abortions into the informed consent process. As the dissenting
opinion in the Eighth Circuit correctly observed, “Rather than focusing on medically relevant
and factually accurate information designed to assist a woman’s free choice, the Act expresses
ideological beliefs aimed at making it more difficult for women to choose abortions.” Id. at
740 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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the doctrine might become a powerful deregulatory tool for any party that disagrees
not only with the specific disclosure, but also with the regulatory regime itself, thus
converting the disclosure from a statement of fact into a discussion of a controversial
topic. Further expansion of the law of compelled speech to invalidate such
regulations risks undermining the foundations of the regulatory state unless the Court
pulls back from this dangerous and misguided elaboration of First Amendment
doctrine.
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